

# Argumentation Logic

1

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# AL Introduction

2

- **A re-examination of “classical” logical reasoning - Propositional Logic- as a Logic of Arguments.**
  - Closer to original inception of logic?
  - Closer to **Common Sense Human Reasoning?**
  
- **Methods: Argumentation Theory from AI and Syllogistic Roots of Logic**
  - **Natural Acceptability** Semantics for Argumentation
  - Re-examine **Reductio ad Absurdum** in **Natural Deduction**

# Motivation from AI

3

## □ Computing and Artificial Intelligence

### ■ Common Sense Human Reasoning?

- **Default Reasoning**, e.g. Temporal Persistence
- **Reasoning about actions and change**
- **Knowledge Qualification**, e.g. Resolving contradictory information, or Legal Reasoning

### ■ Text Comprehension

- **“I am attending the 8<sup>th</sup> Panhellenic Logic Symposium in Athens in July.”**
  - **Elaborative Inferences**, e.g. “I will be in Athens sometime in July”, “I am an academic/logician”...
  - **Conflict resolution**, e.g. 8<sup>th</sup> PLS?

## □ Case of “Logic from Computer Science”.

# The (traditional) logic side of things

# Part 1: “Syllogistic roots” of Logic

6



- Consider **Propositional Logic (PL)** and its **Natural Deduction (ND)** proof system.
- Separate out the **Reductio ad Absurdum (RA)** rule ( $\neg I$  rule) as a different type of proof rule or argument.
  - Is it an argument at all? **Is RA an axiomatic part of Logic?**
- Call (c.f. Archimedes) the rest of ND, **Direct Logic/Proofs**,  $\vdash_{MRA}$ 
  - **Direct Logic**: basic logic underlying **Argumentation Logic**
- Note that in any RA derivation,  $[\phi \dots \dots \perp]$ , we have a **direct derivation** of the **contradiction**.

# Reductio ad Absurdum in ND

## Example 1

7

- $\Gamma 1 = \{\neg(p \wedge q), \neg q \rightarrow \perp\}$



**Note 1:** Direct (sub) proofs under  $\vdash_{MRA}$  : “ $\vdash_{ND}$  minus RA”

**Note 2:** Relevance of hypothesis to inconsistency:

**Genuine Absurdity Property**

# Reductio ad Absurdum in ND

## Example 2

8

□  $\top 2 = \{\neg(\neg p \wedge \neg q)\} \vdash_{\text{ND}} p \vee q$

$[\neg(p \vee q)$

$[p$   
 $p \vee q$   
 $\neg(p \vee q)$  (copy)  
 $\perp]$

$[q$   
 $p \vee q$   
 $\neg(p \vee q)$  (copy)  
 $\perp]$

$\neg p$

$\neg q$

$\neg p \wedge \neg q$   
 $\perp]$

$[\neg(p \vee q)$

$[\neg p$

$[q$   
 $p \vee q$   
 $\neg(p \vee q)$  (copy)  
 $\perp]$

$\neg q$

$\neg p \wedge \neg q$   
 $\perp]$

$p$

$p \vee q$   
 $\perp]$

# Genuine RAND derivations

9

## Genuine RAND derivations:

[ $\phi$   
 .  
 [ $\phi'$   
 .  
 copy( $\Phi$ )  
 . [ $\Psi$   
 . .  
 . .  
 $\neg\Psi$   $\perp$ ]  
 $\perp$ ]  
 $\perp$ ]

$\top \cup \Phi \cup \neg\Psi \not\vdash_{MRA} \perp$

$\phi'$  is necessary for the direct derivation of  $\perp$

□ Do **Genuine** RAND derivations always exist?



# AL equivalent to PL (“restricted” to $\neg, \wedge$ )

- **Main Lemma:** For **consistent** theories (in  $\neg, \wedge$ ) if there is a **RAND** derivation from  $\phi$  then there is a **Genuine** **RAND** derivation from  $\phi$ .
  - **Proof:** Is this result known?
  - Hence the **Restricted form of RA** does not compromise completeness of **ND**.
- **Equivalence** through the universality of  $\neg, \wedge$ .
  - If we interpret  $\vee$  and  $\rightarrow$  through their classical equivalence in terms of  $\neg, \wedge$  then **AL=PL**.
  - **But this is not necessary** (see below part 2).

# The Argumentation side of things


# The other Argumentation side

13

- **Can we see Logic as a Theory of Arguments?**
  - **How can we do this?**
    - **Can we have Logical Formulae as Arguments?**
    - **Entailment through Acceptable Arguments?**
  - **How can we link this to Classical logic (PL)?**
    - **Reformulate PL as a Logic of Arguments?**
  
- **Can we formulate Natural Deduction with restricted Reductio ad Absurdum as a Logic of Arguments?**
  - **Using argumentation theory/semantics from AI?**
  - **Build on the “success” of Argumentation in AI and CSR.**

# Argumentation Interpretation of Reduction ad Absurdum - Informal

14




# Central Idea of Argumentation Logic

15


- **Logical Formulae as Arguments.** Arguments **attack** each other through a **Direct Derivation** of inconsistency.
- **Argumentation Framework**  $\langle \text{Args}, \text{Att}, \text{Def} \rangle$  for Logic:
  - **Args:** **Sets of Propositional Formulae:**  $\Delta$   
(Direct proofs from  $\Delta$  and the given theory,  $T$ )
  - **Att:** **A attacks  $\Delta$  :**  $T \cup \Delta \cup A \vdash_{MRA} \perp$
  - **Def:** **Def**  $\subseteq$  **Att**
- **Recover Reductio ad Absurdum** through the **semantics of argumentation.** BUT WHICH SEMANTICS?
- **The problem of Logic ανάγεται to the question: What is a **good, or acceptable,** argument?**

# Argumentation Interpretation of Reduction ad Absurdum

$$T2 = \{\neg(\neg p \wedge \neg q)\}$$



$\Delta = \{\neg(p \vee q)\}$  is **NOT** an acceptable argument



# Argumentation in AI - Basics

- ☐ **Argumentation Framework:**  $\langle \text{Args}, \text{Attacks}, \text{Defence} \rangle$
- ☐ **Semantics:**  $\Delta$  is an **admissible** set of arguments iff:
  - $\Delta$  does **not attack** itself.
  - $\Delta$  **defends** against all sets that attack it:
    - $\Delta$  **attacks back** A.
- ☐ **Is the Admissible semantics “complete”?**
  - ☐ What if an attack is by itself “no good”, e.g. self-attacking?
  - ☐ Do we still need to explicitly defend/attack it back?
- ☐ **Admissibility semantics  $\Rightarrow$  Acceptability semantics**

# Acceptability Semantics

## Informal Motivation

18

- **Acceptability:** Follow the “**universal**” intuition:

An argument (or a set of arguments) can be **accepted** iff all its counter-arguments can be **rejected**

- Can we formalize **directly** this intuition?
  - How are we to understand the “**Rejection of Arguments**”?
    - As “**Can not be Accepted**”?
  - An argument can play a role in rejecting its counter-arguments
    - The **Acceptance** of arguments is a **RELATIVE** notion.



# Acceptability Semantics

## Definition

- A set  $\Delta$  is acceptable relative to  $\Delta'$ :  $\text{Acc}(\Delta, \Delta')$ .

$\text{Acc}(\Delta, \Delta')$  iff  $\Delta \subseteq \Delta'$ , or

for any  $A$  s.t.  $A$  attacks  $\Delta$ :

there exists  $D$  s.t.  $D$  defends/attacks back  $A$   
and  $\text{acc}(D, \Delta' \cup \Delta \cup A)$ .

- Acceptability,  $\text{Acc}(-, -)$ , is defined as the least fixed point of a monotonic operator,  $F_{\text{ACC}}$ , on the binary relations on sets of arguments.
- Acceptability Semantics:  $\Delta$  is acceptable iff  $\text{Acc}(\Delta, \{\})$  holds.

# Central use of Acceptability Semantics

20

- Acceptability of arguments is a **relative notion**.
- Captures a **semantic** notion of **self-defeating** (set of) argument(s):
  - **S** is **self-defeating** iff there exists an attacking set, **A**, against **S** such that  $\neg \text{Acc}(A, \{S\})$  and  $\text{Acc}(A, S)$  hold.
- **Self-defeating S: renders one of its attacks acceptable**
  - This is a kind of **Reductio ad Absurdum Principle!**
- **Acceptability** deals with **(odd) cycles** of attacks.
  - **Compare with “cyclic reasoning” of Reduction ad Absurdum!**

# Argumentation Logic

## Self-defeat $\leftrightarrow$ Reductio ad Absurdum

$\phi$  Is AL-entailed  $\text{iff}_{\text{def}}$   $\text{ACC}(\{\phi\}, \{\})$  and  $\neg\text{ACC}(\{\neg\phi\}, \{\})$

### Theorem

$\neg\text{Acc}(\{\phi\}, \{\}) \Leftrightarrow$  **Genuine** RAND derivation for  $\phi$

**Corollary** (from Lemma)

For consistent T: **AL = PL**

# Argumentation Logic Results (1)

22

- **AL distinguishes two forms of Inconsistency of T**
  - **Classically inconsistent but directly consistent (under  $\vdash_{MRA}$ )**
    - **Violation of rule of «Excluded Middle».**
    - **For some,  $\phi$ , neither  $\phi$  nor  $\neg\phi$  is acceptable:  $T = \{ a \rightarrow \perp, \neg a \rightarrow \perp \}$**
    - **$a \vee \neg a$  not AL-entailed, but  $b \vee \neg b$  is AL-entailed**
  - **Directly inconsistent**
    - **For some  $\phi$ , T has a **direct argument** for  $\phi$  and  $\neg\phi$ :  $T = \{ \phi, \neg\phi \}$**

**AL is a paraconsistent logic.**

# Example of Directly Consistent: Logical Paradox

## **“Not a contradiction but a paradox”**

- **“A barber shaves anyone that does not shave himself”**
  - $\neg \text{ShavesHimself(Person)} \rightarrow \text{ShavedByBarber(Person)}$
  - $\text{ShavesHimself(Person)} \rightarrow \neg \text{ShavedByBarber(Person)}$
- **Self-reference: When Person = barber**
  - $\text{ShavedByBarber(barber)} \rightarrow \text{ShavesHimself(barber)}$
  - $\neg \text{ShavedByBarber(barber)} \rightarrow \neg \text{ShavesHimself(barber)}$

# Logic Paradox Example in AL

- Classically Inconsistent due to the law of **excluded middle**
  - **$SB(P)$  or  $\neg SB(P)$  , for any person  $P$ , even for  $P=barber$ .**
- In AL the law of excluded middle for  $SB(b)$  does not hold
  - $\neg ACC(\{SB(b)\},\{\})$   **$SB(b)$  is non-acceptable**
  - $\neg ACC(\{\neg SB(b)\},\{\})$   **$\neg SB(b)$  is non-acceptable**
  - The law  **$(SB(b) \vee \neg SB(b))$  is non-acceptable.**
- **AL gives up the law of excluded middle (when needed)!**

# Argumentation Logic Results (2)

25

- For **classically consistent** theories **AL = PL** (for the **restricted** language of  $\neg$  and  $\wedge$ )
  
- **But** we can define AL directly on the whole language of PL with  $\vee$  and  $\rightarrow$ 
  - Interpretation of **implication** in AL differs from PL, e.g.
    - **Both**  $a \rightarrow b$  and  $\neg(a \rightarrow b)$  **are acceptable** w.r.t. to  $T = \{\neg a\}$
  
- Can also take **different Direct Logic** underlying AL.

# AL – What does it mean?

- **Computing (on the Web) today is “demanding” Common Sense Human Reasoning**
- **Human oriented Computing: Agency + Human Interaction**
  - “I am attending the 8<sup>th</sup> Panhellenic Logic Symposium in Athens in July.”
- **“Conjecture:” For Common Sense Reasoning we need to challenge Classical Logic.**



# Loogle

- **QUERY:** “I am attending the 8<sup>th</sup> Panhellenic Logic Symposium in Athens in July. **Please suggest places to stay.**”
  - **Data/Information integration over the database/Knowledge base of the Web**
- **ANSWER:** “**The Golden Age hotel : this is close to the Music Hall where a concert will take place in its gardens.**”
  - **Personalized, Justified (and persuasive) recommendations**

# Conclusions

29

- A **reformulation of PL** in terms of argumentation under **acceptability semantics** => **Argumentation Logic (AL)**
  - **AL** is a conservative extension of PL into a type of **Relevance Para-consistent Logic**
  - Only **genuine** use of Reductio ad Absurdum
  - **Implication** in AL differs from classical material implication
  
- **Implication is a hybrid of default rule and contrapositive reasoning**
  - **UNIFY classical and defeasible reasoning under argumentation???**
  
- This questioning of CL by AL **is rooted in** (a part of) **“AI Computing”** that needs the automation of **Common Sense Human Reasoning**
  - Not driven from the needs of strict Mathematical Reasoning but from **open Human Reasoning**, e.g. Natural Language or “linguistic” reasoning.

# AL – What does it mean?

- **Philosophy (of Science):**
  - **Logic Describes vs Logic Captures**
  - **Logic: Language vs Realism**